lessons from Vietnam

The other week Robert S. McNamara, "the architect of the Vietnam War" died. A couple NPR programs played excerpts of interviews he did after he wrote In Retrospect:The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam. The local library had a copy so I checked it out. It was interesting thought-provoking book. At the end McNamara offered eleven "Lessons of Vietnam" which I thought were helpful reminders. Needless to say I don't think President Bush or V-P Cheney read the book, and I wish President Obama would read it before he sends more troops to Afghanistan.

The lessons
1. "We misjudged then-as we have since-the geopolitical intentions of our adversaries...and we exaggerated the dangers to the United States of their actions." [Does Saddam Hussein and his supposed weapons of mass destruction come to mind?]

2. "We viewed the people and leaders of South Vietnam in terms of our own experience....We totally misjudged the political forces within the country?"

3. "We underestimated the power of nationalism to motivate a people...to fight and die for their beliefs and values-and we continue to do so today in many parts of the world."

4. "Our misjudgments of friend and foe alike reflected our profound ignorance of the history, culture, and politics of the people in the area, and the personalities and habits of their leaders." McNamara explains how at the time there were numerous US officials with a strong understanding of the Soviet Union but there were no senior officials with expertise in Southeast Asia. I think the same could be said of the middle east. [In a Washington Post article from October 16, 2005 there were only eight people in the U.S. diplomatic corps "fluent at the highest levels" of Arabic. http:www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/15/AR2005101500104.html)
Another interesting article which comments on Bush's ignorance of the middle east (what is the difference between a Sunni and a Shi'a?) is at http://www.thenation.com/doc/20080602/bazzi.

5. "We failed then-as we have since-to recognize the limitations of modern, high-technology military equipment, forces and doctrine in confronting unconventional, highly motivated people's movements. We failed as well to adapt our military tactics to the task of winning the hearts and minds of people from a totally different culture." [I've watched enough documentaries and film clips of the military in action to understand that while some of the soldiers may be doing good things, getting forced off the road or shot at by a U.S. military convoy, doesn't do much to win "hearts and minds." [Throughout his book, McNamara relates the heavy reliance on bombing Vietnam, even after in his analysis it was no longer effective. Instead, they kept bombing to avoid the appearance of being weak.]

6. " We failed to draw Congress and the American people into a full and frank discussion and debate of the pros and cons of a large scale U.S. military involvement in Southeast Asia before we initiated the action." [Instead we were told to trust our leaders, that to question policy was to raise questions about one's patriotism, and in any case, the people of Iraq would welcome us as liberators, and it would all be over in six months.]

7. " After action got under way and unanticipated events forced us off our planned course, we failed to retain popular support in part because we did not explain fully what was happening and why we were doing what we did...." [see above- instead value secrecy, raise questions about critics loyalty or otherwise discredit critics.]

8. " We did not recognize that neither our people nor our leaders are omniscient.... We do not have the God-given right to shape every nation in our own image or as we choose. [We just had a leader who claimed God told him what to do.]
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2005/oct/07/iraq.usa

9. "We did not hold to the principle that U.S. military action-other than in response to direct threats to our own security- should be carried out only conjunction with multinational forces supported fully (and not merely cosmetically) by the international community."

10. "We failed to recognize that in international affairs, as in other aspects of life, there may be problems for which there are no immediate solutions."

11. McNamara argues that the administrations he served did not organize structurally in a way to deal effectively deal with Vietnam over the long term.

There is one more which too many people forget, "Wars generate their own momentum and follow the law of unanticipated consequences." (p. 174)

A couple of other things which seemed evident as I read the book. There was little to no diversity among the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. The advisers were all white males, most of whom graduated from Harvard. McNamara discusses their common experiences of growing up during the Depression, involvement in World War II, and of course their education. My guess is that thinking outside of the box wasn't highly valued, even if any of them were capable of doing so. McNamara and the others seemed trapped by their worldview where every world event was seen through the lens of the Cold War. In the end, if you want to understand the Vietnam war from the perspective of a man who helped plan much of it, this would be a good book to read.